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BRIEF REPORT
Faking on direct, indirect, and behavioural
measures of spider fear: Can you get away with it?
Oliver Langner, Machteld Ouwens, Marjolein Muskens,
Julia Trumpf, Eni S. Becker, and Mike Rinck
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
We tested direct, indirect, and behavioural measures of fear of spiders under neutral
instructions, and when participants were asked to fake high and low fear of spiders.
Our findings indicate that the Approach Avoidance Task (AAT) was the only
measure that could be faked in one of the faking conditions only. We also assessed
how easily faked results could be detected on each measure for different diagnostic
criteria. The direct and behavioural measures showed good performance for all
criteria. The AAT performed comparably only for a conservative criterion, when
detecting fakers is less important than correctly labelling non-fakers.
Keywords: Indirect measures; AAT; Direct measures; Faking; Fake-detection.
In the measurement of anxiety and other psychiatric phenomena, direct
measures such as questionnaires are often criticised for their susceptibility to
response bias and faking. Critically, direct measures rely on both the
accessibility of information and the participants’ willingness to accurately
report it. As an alternative, several researchers have developed indirect
measures. Instead of asking directly, these measures assess responses like
reaction times, which are indirectly related to, but significantly influenced by,
the measured concept.1 Because the relationship between task and influen-
cing concept is not obvious, these measures are generally assumed to suffer
1 By indirect measures we refer mainly to reaction time tasks, as those are widely used. But
indirect measures of other variables than latencies exist.
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less from susceptibility problems (Fazio & Olson, 2003). So far, however,
there exists little evidence supporting this claim.
Studies testing the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee,
& Schwartz, 1998) have delivered equivocal results: Whereas some found
that it was less prone to faking than explicit measures (Schnabel, Banse, &
Asendorpf, 2006; Steffens, 2004), or could be faked only after giving specific
instructions (Kim, 2003), others found that prior task experience is sufficient
to invent faking strategies (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Steffens, 2004).
Further, faking the IAT might be easier if implicit attitudes are not deeply
elaborated (De Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007).
Faking has also been tested for other indirect measures: Recent studies
showed affective priming to be susceptible to faking and strategic effects
(Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008).
More promising results have been found for the non-latency-based Condi-
tional Reasoning Test, as faking occurred only when the assessment purpose
was disclosed (LeBreton, Barksdale, Robin, & James, 2007). Clearly, further
testing with other measures is needed to determine whether indirect
measures can be considered a viable alternative to direct measures, and if
the claim about their lower faking susceptibility is justified.
A shortcoming of most faking studies is that direct and indirect measures
were rarely directly compared under faking conditions to ascertain how each
is affected by intentional deception (Schnabel et al., 2006). Further,
employing direct and indirect measures along with observable behavioural
responses can provide information regarding the controllability of various
aspects of the underlying processes. In this study, fear of spiders provided a
practical framework to examine these questions, because established direct,
indirect, and behavioural measures with sufficient variance within the
population are available. We used the Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS;
Rinck et al., 2002) and the Fear of Spider Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski &
O’Donohue, 1995) as direct measures, a Behavioural Approach Test (BAT)
as a behavioural measure, and the Approach Avoidance Task (AAT) as an
indirect measure of fear for spiders. The AAT involves moving a joystick
towards or away from oneself in response to a stimulus. It is based on
findings that participants respond faster when pushing aversive stimuli away
or when pulling pleasant stimuli towards themselves (Rinck & Becker, 2007;
Solarz, 1960). Results for a similar joystick-based procedure (IAP; Schnabel
et al., 2006) were already promising in that it was found to be more robust
against faking than direct measures, and as robust as the IAT.
We asked participants to perform all tests under a neutral and two faking
conditions. In the neutral condition, participants received the standard
instructions for each test. In the fake-high and fake-low conditions, we
instructed participants to adjust their responses to appear either highly
fearful or not at all fearful of spiders. These rather unspecific instructions, in































































our view, reflect well the situation faced by someone with faking intentions,
as most participants would not have extensive prior knowledge regarding the
task and thus can only rely on experience gained during the task.
We additionally tested in which direction (fake-low or fake-high anxiety)
faking was easier to accomplish on each measure. This is particularly
important as fakeability may not be symmetric in both directions on all
measures. For example, while responding more slowly on a reaction time
(RT) measure may be possible, responding more quickly may prove difficult.
Besides testing fakeability, it is important to know how easily faked
results can be detected. In general, faking is harmful only if faked results can
not be identified. In this sense, a good measure is either hard to fake or
makes it easy to identify fakers. Attempts to assess successful faking have
been made for the IAT (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005), but faked results could
not reliably be detected. Here, we determined cutoff values for each measure
to categorise data as faked for three different diagnostic criteria, and we




A total of 59 students (50 female) from Radboud University Nijmegen
participated in the study, with mean age of 22.1 years (SD5.1).
Participants completed the SAS prior to the experiment. Pre-test-SAS
scores ranged from 0 to 23 with mean 9.8 (SD7.2), nearly spanning the
possible range of 0 to 24. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and received 9 Euro or course credit for participation.
Questionnaires
We used two established direct measures of fear of spiders: the SAS (Rinck et
al., 2002) and the FSQ (Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995). The SAS has 4 and
the FSQ 18 items, both with scales ranging from 0 to 6. We used the Dutch
FSQ (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996) and created a Dutch version of the SAS
via back-translation. All items were successively presented on a monitor and
responses were recorded by the computer.
AAT stimuli
AAT stimuli consisted of eight spider and eight butterfly pictures serving as
negatively and positively valenced stimuli, and a white frame with black
background as neutral stimulus. To reflect natural variability, we chose
pictures of butterflies and spiders that varied in size, colour, and shape. For































































each picture, high and wide format versions were created, with image
dimensions of 400320 and 320400 pixels, respectively. To produce a
zoom effect while moving the joystick, we used similar image sizes as Rinck
and Becker (2007), varying between 80100 and 560700 pixels.
Reliabilities
The direct measures have good psychometric properties, with Cronbach’s
alphas of .96 and .92 for the FSQ and SAS, respectively; and with testretest
reliabilities between .91 and .95 for the FSQ and .88 for the SAS (Muris &
Merckelbach, 1996; Rinck et al., 2002). Split-half reliabilities for the AAT
were generally lower, between .71 and .80 (Rinck & Becker, 2007).
Procedure
The experiment had a neutral and two faking conditions. In the neutral
condition, participants performed all tests under standard instructions. In
the fake-high (fake-low) condition, we instructed participants as follows:
Please try to behave like someone who is highly afraid (not afraid) of spiders. Even if
you are in reality not afraid (afraid) of spiders, please try to fake your performance
on the tasks so that someone analysing your results will believe that you are highly
afraid of spiders (not afraid of spiders at all).
Task order was counterbalanced across subjects but remained constant
throughout all experimental conditions. All participants started with the
neutral condition, while the order of faking conditions was counterbalanced
across participants. This ensured that the neutral condition was not
influenced by the faking instructions, and gave participants an opportunity
to gain experience with all the measures, which they could use to generate
faking strategies (Steffens, 2004). The experiment took about 50 minutes.
The AAT consisted of pushing or pulling a joystick in response to the
picture format. Half of the participants pushed high-format and pulled wide-
format pictures, while the other half received opposite instructions. Picture
content was irrelevant for this task. We instructed participants to respond
quickly without committing too many errors. Each AAT had 160 trials and
took 10 minutes. The 32 high- and wide-format spider and butterfly pictures
were each shown 4 times, yielding 128 trials. Additionally, 16 high- and 16
wide-format empty-frame stimuli were presented. Stimulus order was
randomised with the restriction that identical pictures did not appear
consecutively. In the neutral condition, the AAT started with 20 practice
trials containing empty frame stimuli. Participants started each trial by
moving the joystick to the centre position and pressing a button. Then a
picture appeared on the screen, and participants had to indicate by a joystick































































movement whether the image was in high or wide format. To strengthen the
impression of pushing the image away or pulling it closer, the displayed
images shrank or grew corresponding to the joystick movement. Moving the
joystick by 308 in either direction made the picture disappear. We measured
reaction time (RT) as time between stimulus onset and offset.
The BAT was conducted in a separate room, in which a terrarium with a
living tarantula was located on a table 4 m from the door. We took
participants to the closed room and instructed them to open the door and
approach the spider as quickly and closely as possible. Participants could
stop whenever they wanted. The time taken to approach the spider was
registered, as was the remaining distance to the spider.
RESULTS
Reported p-values are based on GreenhouseGeisser corrected degrees of
freedom (dfs) where appropriate. For readability, uncorrected dfs are
reported along with the df-correction parameters.
Fakeability of measures
Self-report measures. For both questionnaires, we found strong effects of
faking condition. Sum scores were significantly lower in the fake-low
condition and significantly higher in the fake-high condition compared to
the neutral condition. Average sum scores (SDs) were 2.4 (10.8), 19.2 (23.7),
and 98.8 (12.1) for the FSQ; and 0.9 (3.5), 8.8 (7.4), and 22.9 (2.1) for the
SAS in the fake-low, neutral, and fake-high conditions, respectively. An
ANCOVA with faking condition as repeated-measures factor and pre-test-
SAS score as covariate yielded significant main effects of faking condition
for the FSQ, F(2, 114)635.3, pB.01, h2p.92, o.89; and for the SAS,
F(2, 114)374.8, pB.01, h2p.87, o.62. Pairwise comparisons between
all faking conditions were significant for both questionnaires, all ts(58)5.6,
pB.01.
Behavioural measure. We calculated the average approach speed on the
BAT in centimetres per second. When participants refused to enter the
room, which happened only in the fake-high condition, their speed was set to
zero. As expected, participants adjusted their speed corresponding to faking
conditions: They approached the spider significantly faster in the fake-low
and significantly slower in the fake-high condition, compared to the neutral
condition. Average approach speeds (SDs) were 70.9 (31.4), 54.7 (33.0), and
9.6 (11.6) cm/s in the fake-low, neutral, and fake-high conditions, respec-
tively. The ANCOVA with factors faking condition and pre-test-SAS score
showed a significant main effect of faking condition, F(2, 114)85.9,































































pB.01, h2p.60, o.92. All pairwise comparisons between faking condi-
tions were significant, all ts(58)]2.95, pB.02.
Indirect measure: RTs. We determined median RTs for each participant
and AAT condition.2 A 332 (Picture TypeFaking Condition
Movement) repeated-measures ANCOVA with pre-test-SAS score as covari-
ate showed significant main effects and interactions for all non-SAS-related
effects, F]7.97, pB.01, .325o5.74 for all effects. Post hoc analyses
revealed an obvious strategy that participants had used in the fake-high
condition: Participants responded much more slowly when they had to
pull spider pictures closer (see Table 1), yielding a significant Faking
ConditionMovement interaction when analysing spider pictures only,
F(2, 104)26.9, pB.01, h2p.34, o.53. This was confirmed by a
significant contrast for spider pictures, comparing RTs of pull responses
in the fake-high condition to the average RTs of all other conditions,
t(53)4.69, pB.01 (one-tailed), rcontrast.54.
Indirect measure: Errors. We calculated the percentage of errors for each
subject and AAT condition. Prior to analyses, percentages were arcsin-
TABLE 1
Mean percentage of errors and mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) of the AAT.
Standard deviations are given in parentheses
Instructions
Fake-low Neutral Fake-high
Picture type Pull Push Pull Push Pull Push
RTs
Butterfly 743 (131) 736 (149) 801 (135) 803 (158) 872 (186) 846 (202)
Empty 712 (121) 692 (137) 766 (139) 769 (143) 794 (134) 762 (151)
Spider 726 (134) 749 (155) 784 (133) 815 (158) 1100 (514) 788 (206)
Error rates
Butterfly 2.6 (3.5) 1.7 (3.5) 2.8 (3.4) 2.4 (3.4) 4.0 (5.8) 5.6 (7.6)
Empty 1.1 (2.6) 1.3 (2.8) 2.3 (3.4) 1.6 (3.2) 1.7 (4.2) 2.1 (4.1)
Spider 1.6 (2.9) 2.5 (3.9) 2.8 (3.7) 2.2 (3.1) 42.0 (41.0) 2.0 (3.4)
2 Usually AAT data are analysed as AAT effects: For each condition, median pull RTs are
subtracted from the corresponding push RTs. Positive (negative) AAT effects indicate stronger
approach (avoidance) tendencies towards the stimulus. As faking appeared systematically on RT
level, the analysis of AAT effects is omitted.































































transformed, although for readability non-transformed percentages are
reported (see Table 1).3
A 332 (Picture TypeFaking ConditionMovement) repeated-
measures ANCOVA with pre-test-SAS score as covariate was calculated. All
non-SAS-related main effects and interactions were significant, F]28.4,
pB.01, h2p].34, .295o5.59 for all effects. Post hoc tests confirmed an
obvious pattern: Participants made more errors in the fake-high condition
for pulling spider pictures towards themselves, t(58)6.89, pB.01 (for
pairwise comparisons, see Table 1). Error rates for this stimulusmovement
combination were 42%, 2.8%, and 1.6% in the fake-high, neutral, and fake-
low conditions, respectively. Obviously, participants often deliberately
pushed spider pictures in the fake-high condition, despite clear instructions
to pull. A weaker, but similar effect occurred for butterfly pictures:
Participants made more errors in the fake-high condition compared to the
other faking conditions, when pushing butterfly pictures away from
themselves, t(58)2.98, pB.01. Error rates for pushing butterflies were
5.6%, 2.4%, and 1.8% in the fake-high, neutral, and fake-low conditions,
respectively. Participants deliberately pulled butterfly pictures in the fake-
high condition, despite instructions to push.
Detectability of faked results
To assess the detectability of faking, data from the fake-low and fake-high
conditions were compared to those from the neutral condition. For each
measure, we constructed empirical ROC curves from the hit and false alarm
rates of all possible cutoff values, and fitted the best ROC curve (Macmillan
& Creelman, 2004). The hit rate is the proportion of fake-high or fake-low
responses correctly identified as faked, whereas the false alarm rate is the
proportion of neutral responses incorrectly labelled as faked. As most ROC
curves were asymmetric due to different variances in the faked and non-
faked data, the average detection performance is best characterised by the
measure da (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Values for da of 0, 1, 2, and 3
correspond to a proportion of correct identifications of .50, .69, .84, and .93,
respectively.
We additionally report cutoff values for three diagnostic criteria: a
conservative criterion (correct identification of non-fakers twice as impor-
tant as detection of fakers), an unbiased criterion (both goals equally
important), and a lenient criterion (detection of fakers twice as important as
correctly identifying non-fakers), corresponding to slopes of 2, 1, and 0.5 on
the ROC curve, respectively (Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000). In Table 2,




; which is standardly used to
correct for the inherent dependence of means and variances in proportion data (Winer, 1971).
































































Cutoff values, hit rates (H), false alarm (FA) rates, and d? values for detection of faked results under fake-high and fake-low conditions.
Results for three diagnostic criteria and either for the study sample only or for data from other studies included
Neutral vs. fake-high Neutral vs. fake-low
Study sample Including other studies Study sample Including other studies
Test Cutoff H FA d? H FA d? Cutoff H FA d? H FA d?
Conservative criterion
FSQ ]72 .93 .03 3.36 .93 .13 2.60 2
SAS ]21 .90 .05 2.93 .90 .18 2.20 50 .78 .08 2.17 .78 .17 1.72
BAT 521 cm/s .88 .05 2.82 .88 .15 2.21 ]81 cm/s .27 .08 0.79 .27 .14 0.47
AAT RT ]1063 ms .36 .02 1.7 .36 .02 1.70 1
AAT error ]13% .58 .02 2.26 .58 .01 2.53 1
AAT comb. .76 .03 2.59 .76 .03 2.59 1
Unbiased criterion
FSQ ]70 .95 .03 3.53 .95 .15 2.68 50 .73 .20 1.45 .73 .22 1.39
SAS ]20 .93 .10 2.76 .93 .24 2.18 2
BAT 524 cm/s .93 .10 2.76 .93 .21 2.28 ]53 cm/s .73 .46 0.71 .73 .48 0.66
AAT RT ]962 ms .42 .12 0.97 .42 .05 1.44 1
AAT error ]4% .68 .19 1.35 .68 .14 1.55 1
AAT comb. .83 .23 1.69 .83 .19 1.83 1
Lenient criterion
FSQ ]63 .97 .07 3.36 .97 .23 2.62 51 .86 .29 1.63 .86 .29 1.64
SAS ]19 .93 .14 2.56 .93 .29 2.03 51 .90 .20 2.12 .90 .28 1.86
BAT 529 cm/s .95 .14 2.73 .95 .25 2.32 ]41 cm/s .93 .68 1.01 .93 .64 1.12
AAT RT ]790 ms .63 .44 0.48 .63 .23 1.07 1
AAT error ]1% .75 .54 0.57 .75 .41 0.90 1
AAT comb. .89 .76 0.52 .89 .58 1.02 1
Notes: 1Cutoff values for the AAT and the Neutral vs. Fake-low comparison were not computable because participants were unable to modify their AAT












































































the cutoff values for all measures and diagnostic criteria are listed with the
corresponding d? values, hit rates, and false alarm rates. Here d? is reported,
as it characterises the sensitivity for a fixed criterion appropriately.
Self-report measures. Average detection performance for detecting fake-
high or fake-low results in the FSQ was da3.46 and da1.70, respectively;
and da2.70 and da2.09 for the SAS. For all diagnostic criteria,
performance for detecting fake-high results was nearly perfect for the
FSQ, d?]3.36, and lower but still very high for the SAS, d?]2.56. This was
different for identifying fake-low data: Here the SAS performed better, d?]
2.12, than the FSQ, d?]1.45. Note that no cutoff values for the conservative
criterion of the FSQ and the unbiased criterion of the SAS could be derived,
as no empirical cutoff values near the derived ROC slopes existed.
Behavioural measure. Average detection performance was da2.72 and
da0.71 for detecting fake-high and fake-low results, respectively. Note-
worthy, setting the cutoff value to 0 cm/s (participants didn’t move at all),
already detected 30% of the fake-high results successfully without any false
alarms.
Indirect measure. A two-step approach was used in analysing the AAT:
First we used errors and median RTs separately to detect faked results; later
we combined both to optimise detection performance. We used only trials
with spider pictures to be pulled, as participants strategically faked on those
trials. Notably, RTs and errors did not significantly differ between the fake-
low and the neutral condition, showing that participants were unable to
strategically change their responses in the fake-low condition. Therefore,
detection performance and cutoff values were not determined for this
condition.
The analyses revealed two easily detectable faking strategies: Some
participants frequently pushed spider pictures away irrespective of instruc-
tions, others responded very slowly when they had to pull spider pictures
closer. The first strategy was evident in the error rates of the fake-high
condition, with an average detection performance of da1.03. Interestingly,
detection performance varied greatly between the different diagnostic
criteria, due to different variances in the neutral and fake-high error rates
and resulting asymmetric ROC curves. Whereas performance was very high
for the conservative criterion, d?2.26, it dropped to d?0.57 for the lenient
criterion. The same was true for median RTs, assessing the second faking
strategy: Performance for the conservative criterion was good, d?1.70, but
dropped to d?0.48 for the lenient criterion, resulting in an average
detection performance of da0.50.































































To assess the performance of errors and RTs together, we determined
for each diagnostic criterion, which error/RT data pairs were labelled
as fakers by at least one of the cutoff values. This combination yielded a
better performance, being most pronounced for the conservative criterion,
d?2.59, and only minimal for the lenient criterion, d?0.56, showing that
most participants adopted only one of the faking strategies.
Detection performance including independent data
Two aspects of the earlier detection analysis are potentially problematic:
First, our sample contained few high or low spider-fearful participants,
possibly inflating detection performance. Second, detection performance is
assessed with the same data used to define the cutoff values, also possibly
overestimating detection performance. To estimate detection performance in
a more realistic context, we included data from high and low spider-fearful
individuals of independent studies and recalculated the signal detection
parameters (see Table 2). Note that hit rates stayed the same, because the
amount of faked data did not change.
Self-report measures. For the FSQ and SAS we included data from
Becker and Rinck (2004), Rinck et al. (2002), and Rinck and Becker (2007).
For both questionnaires, this raised the false alarm rates of the fake-high
condition by 1214%, resulting in lower d?. Nevertheless, detection
performance still was very good for both measures and all diagnostic
criteria, d?]2.03. For the fake-low condition, only the performance of the
SAS was affected, with 89% higher false alarm rates, d?]1.72.
Behavioural measure. For the BAT we included data from Becker and
Rinck (2004), Lange, Heuer, Reinecke, Becker, and Rinck (2008), and
Reinecke, Becker, and Rinck (2008). As for the questionnaires, false alarm
rates in fake-high condition increased by 1011%, resulting in lower, but
still very high detection performance, d?]2.21. For the fake-low condition,
performance was worse for the conservative and unbiased criterion,
d?]0.47, but slightly higher for the lenient criterion, d?1.12.
Indirect measure. We included AAT RT and error data of three
experiments by Rinck and Becker (2007). For RTs, errors, and the
combination of both, false alarm rates were either unchanged or substan-
tially lower for all diagnostic criteria, resulting in unchanged or higher
detection performance (see Table 2).
































































In the present study, we investigated whether direct, indirect, and beha-
vioural measures of fear of spiders could be faked successfully. For this, we
first tested whether participants could change their test responses according
to given faking instructions. We then determined how well faked responses
could be identified by each measure and we provided cutoff values for three
diagnostic contexts.
None of the measures was immune against faking, at least not under both
faking instructions. As expected, participants could substantially change
their scores on the direct measures. Sum scores of both questionnaires lay
near the minimum value in the fake-low and near the maximum value in the
fake-high condition, showing participants’ good understanding of how the
test items measure fear of spiders. For the BAT, participants adjusted their
approach speed towards a spider corresponding to the instructions. Only for
the AAT, fakeability depended on the instruction: Participants could change
their responses in the fake-high condition, but seemed unable to do so in the
fake-low condition. This is another example that indirect measures are not
principally immune against faking.
All measures were capable of identifying fakers within the study sample
successfully, although to a different degree: Both questionnaires and the
BAT showed very good to near perfect detection performance for all
diagnostic criteria, whereas the AAT showed comparable performance only
for the conservative criterion. This indicates that the AAT might be suitable
only when conservative detection of fakers with few false alarms is desired,
whereas the direct and behavioural measures might be applicable over a
wider range of situations. Noteworthy, using both AAT errors and RTs
enhanced detection performance, reflecting that participants used different
faking strategies.
Including data from truly high and low spider-fearful participants of
other studies showed negative effects on detection performance of the direct
and behavioural measures, but no effects or positive ones on AAT
performance. This reflects a considerable overlap of really high or low
spider-fearful data with faked data on the direct and behavioural measures:
Extreme questionnaire scores and extreme approach behaviour do occur,
and do not necessarily indicate faking. In contrast, there was little overlap
between real and faked data on the AAT: In unfaked data, error rates above
10% or mean RTs larger than 1 s are extremely rare.
Our results indicate an inherent confound of fakeability and detectability:
If participants can change their test scores easily to extreme values, these
values can easily be detected. But although detection performance seems
overestimated for some measures if we use only our sample, it stayed high































































even when independent data were added, suggesting that the reported cutoff
values are valid.
Some caution is warranted when generalising the results: The sample
contained mainly female participants, as well as mainly young, computer-
savvy students. Further, the faking conditions were always preceded by the
neutral condition. Although we deliberately chose this order to ensure an
unbiased neutral measurement and to give participants prior task experience
(Steffens, 2004), it might have affected some measures, something that
should be tested in future studies that avoid this order confound. Another
important factor we did not control for is faking motivation, as individuals
with higher faking motivation might produce data not as easily detectable.
Although we encouraged participants to fake in an intelligent and not easily
detected way, the impact of manipulating faking motivation by, for example,
monetary incentives needs to be assessed.
Taken together, the question of whether the AAT is a viable alternative to
direct or behavioural measures of spider fear has no simple answer.
Regarding fakeability, the AAT seems preferable, as it was the only measure
that participants were unable to fake under the fake-low condition.
Considering detectability of fakers, the answer is complex. For conservative
situations, where treating non-fakers correctly is more important, all
measures discriminate well, even with independent data. For the unbiased
and lenient criteria, the direct and behavioural measures outperform the
AAT.
Obviously, it is unwarranted to condemn direct and behavioural measures
while praising indirect measures as immune against faking. Instead, more
studies are needed to identify the specific advantages and disadvantages of
each task.
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